AltynGold: the cheapest way to own the turn in gold - 4.0x EBITDA against a peer median of 6.7x
ALTYNGOLD →Gold has stopped falling and started rising again. AltynGold is the cheapest listed way to own that: it trades at 4.0x EV/EBITDA against a median of 6.7x for the gold producers we cover, it has tripled production in three years and can roughly double it again, its costs are a sixth below the Russian majors and rising at half their rate, and on current prices and its own guidance it will report record numbers this year. Below is the case in six parts, then what sits inside the discount. Figures are as at 10 August 2026.
1. Gold has turned, and the share moves at twice the metal
Gold bottomed at $3,979 an ounce on 16 July and trades at $4,355, up 11%. AltynGold bottomed a day later at 814p and trades at 1,043p, up 28% - and 6% of that came today. That ratio is the whole point of owning a producer rather than the metal: with an all-in sustaining cost of $1,562 an ounce, every dollar of price lands in the margin, and the equity moves at roughly twice the metal. It did so on the way down too - gold fell 21% from its January peak and the shares fell 42% - so this is leverage, not alpha. What matters is that the direction has changed.

2. Production has tripled in three years and can roughly double again
Gold poured went 33,110 ounces in 2023, 37,279 in 2024 and 53,852 in 2025 - a 63% jump in milled tonnes did the work in the final year as the plant reached its rated 1 million tonnes. 2026 is a deliberate plateau: guidance of 50,000-55,000 ounces while the mine catches up with the mill. The next step is already named - processing capacity to 2-2.5 million tonnes a year and production above 100,000 ounces, with a market update promised over the summer, plus a production licence for the adjacent Teren-Sai deposit expected by the end of 2026.

Reserves are not the constraint, and that holds even in the most aggressive expansion case. Proved and probable reserves at Sekisovskoye are 33.45 million tonnes containing 3.80 Moz; at the full 2.5 million tonnes a year that is thirteen years of milling from reserves alone. Add the inferred resource sitting between -400 and -800 metres - another 37.15 million tonnes - and it is twenty-eight years. Add Teren-Sai's 16.43 million tonnes and 1.45 Moz and it is thirty-five. Even doubling and a half the mill leaves a runway measured in decades, and the resource base is larger than the reserves: the annual report puts the projects at roughly 8.42 Moz including the exploration result below -800 metres. Expanding pulls those ounces forward, which is worth doing at $4,355 gold and much less obviously worth doing at $2,000.

3. Costs are 16% below the Russian producers and rising half as fast
AltynGold's all-in sustaining cost went from $1,318 to $1,562 an ounce in 2025, up 19%. That is fast, and it is the number to watch as the mine deepens. But the comparison that matters is with the peers an investor would otherwise buy: the median all-in sustaining cost of the large listed Russian gold producers - Polyus, BTS-Gold and Seligdar - rose 39% to $1,860 an ounce in 2025, on Expert RA data. AltynGold is 16% cheaper per ounce and its costs grew at half the rate.

Part of the difference is currency, and it is worth getting the direction right. The tenge weakened against the dollar through 2025 - 471 to 521 on the annual average - which held dollar costs down; the 19% increase happened despite the currency, not because of it. The rouble did the opposite, and the strong rouble is one of the three reasons the analysts give for the 39% Russian increase, alongside a mineral extraction tax tied to the gold price and wages. The position then reversed: the tenge strengthened from about 538 in September 2025 to 452 on 9 July 2026, some 16%, which is the cost headwind inside this year's numbers. But it has since turned again - 466 today, 3% off that low - and that turn began the same week gold bottomed. If it continues, the 2027 cost line gets the tailwind Kazakhstan had in 2025 and Russia never got.

The same mineral extraction tax mechanism applies in Kazakhstan and it is the reason not all of a price rise reaches the bottom line. In 2025 revenue rose $78.9m and EBITDA rose $50.5m: 64% of the incremental revenue reached EBITDA and 36% was absorbed by tax, depth and contractor rates that follow the metal. Useful to know before extrapolating a gold rally into profit.
4. This year's results will be records - and they are already largely locked in
Most of 2026 is locked in. Gold averaged $4,684 in the first half against $3,074 in the first half of 2025 - up 52% - and the company realised $4,809 in the first quarter on revenue of $56.3m, itself up 122% year on year. On guidance of 50,000-55,000 ounces and a blended realisation near $4,490, the mid case gives revenue of about $236m, EBITDA of about $155m and net profit near $100m at the guided 24.4% tax rate. Against 2025: revenue $175.4m, EBITDA $101.4m, net profit $62.0m.

Free cash flow is the striking line: EBITDA of $155m less about $32m of cash tax and $9m of sustaining capital leaves roughly $113m before any growth spending, against a market capitalisation of $381m. Nearly a third of the company's value in one year. The caveat is real and 2025 supplies it - the same arithmetic would have predicted $76m and the company converted $40m, because $28m went into a build of unsold gold inventory when the state refiner paused acceptance at year end. The first quarter suggests that is unwinding: 11,532 ounces sold against 10,664 poured.
Reporting dates: the second-quarter operational update is due around 21 August on this year's cadence, with production and revenue only. The interim financial statements, with the balance sheet, follow in late September - the company discloses financials twice a year.
5. Net debt disappears this year, dividends start in 2028
Net debt fell from $49.7m to $18.5m during 2025 - 0.18 times EBITDA - after repaying $34.1m of borrowings. On the 2026 forecast and before any expansion spending, that turns into net cash of roughly $95m by year end, or about $123m if the working capital comes back in full. The company will not finish the year there, because the expansion and a tailings dam will absorb part of it, but the direction is not in doubt.
On dividends the position is explicit: the directors did not recommend a payment for 2025 and paid none for 2024, and the board says it continues to review the introduction of a policy. The reason is visible in the debt schedule. Bank borrowings of $21.2m at 6-7% fall due during 2027 and the $10m Astana bond at an 11.25% coupon matures in July 2027, so about $31m comes due in a single year, alongside the second $10m bond in April 2028 and the unfunded expansion. Three claims on the same cash, in that order.
So the realistic first payment is against the 2027 year, paid in 2028, once the maturities are behind and the expansion is either funded or finished. The single broker covering the stock forecasts a free cash flow yield above 20% by 2027 and says that would leave ample room to start paying. To put a number on it: a 30-50% payout of a net profit near $90-100m would be $27-50m, which on today's market value is a yield of 7-14%. That is our arithmetic on a policy that does not yet exist, not company guidance - but it explains why the dividend question is worth tracking rather than dismissing.
6. The shares cost half the sector multiple
AltynGold trades at 3.96x EV/EBITDA after today's move. The eight listed gold producers we cover trade between 4.1x and 11.0x with a median of 6.7x, as the table below sets out. Four independent methods put fair value above the current $381m: our commodity model at an unchanged multiple gives $413m, the share's own median multiple since January 2024 gives $438m, its upper quartile $489m, and Ernst & Young's asset valuation disclosed in the annual report gives $475-519m for Sekisovskoye plus Teren-Sai. None of them requires the gold price to rise.
Listed gold producers in our coverage, EV/EBITDA on the last reported year
| Company | Country | EV/EBITDA | vs AltynGold |
|---|---|---|---|
| AltynGold | Kazakhstan | 4.0x | - |
| Solidcore | Kazakhstan | 4.1x | 1.0x |
| Regis Resources | Australia | 5.5x | 1.4x |
| Gold Fields | South Africa | 6.0x | 1.5x |
| Harmony | South Africa | 6.6x | 1.7x |
| AngloGold Ashanti | South Africa | 6.8x | 1.7x |
| Northern Star | Australia | 8.5x | 2.1x |
| Evolution Mining | Australia | 10.3x | 2.6x |
| Genesis Minerals | Australia | 11.0x | 2.8x |
| Median excluding AltynGold | 6.7x | 1.7x |

The EY figure deserves its footnote because it points the opposite way to the usual assumption. Its modifying factors are disclosed: a long-term gold price of $1,280 an ounce, recovery of 83% and an underground mining cost of $425 an ounce. The cost assumption is far too low - the report itself notes the current cash cost is around $1,250 - but the gold price is under a third of today's, and the report says so, observing that prices are trending near $4,800. Margin under EY's assumptions is $855 an ounce against about $3,090 now. So $475-519m is a floor struck at a $1,280 gold price, not a target.
What the discount contains is worth naming precisely rather than waving at. The London listing brings real disclosure - IFRS accounts, an audit, RNS announcements, a competent person's report - which is more than most frontier producers offer, but it sits on the transition segment, outside the indices. The board is the family: Kanat Assaubayev chairs it, his sons Aidar and Sanzhar sit on it as chief executive and director, and free float is 34%. The related-party note shows $2,959,000 recoverable from a family-controlled company with $843,000 already provisioned against it, and $486,132 of legal fees to a firm where a non-executive director is a partner, unpaid at year end. In June the board confirmed questions about a preliminary request for an investigation arising from a family inheritance dispute involving a shareholder, saying the matter does not concern the company. Liquidity is thin: about 81,000 shares a day, roughly $1m. None of that is a reason the multiple cannot re-rate, but all of it is a reason it has not.
What would close the gap
Three things, in the order they arrive. The second-quarter operational update around 21 August, which should show the grade back near 2.0 g/t after the upper-horizon work finished in April. The expansion announcement promised for the summer, which turns an unfunded ambition into a costed plan - and carries the one real financing risk, since a company with a 34% float and no dividend has obvious reasons to consider equity if the bill is large. Then the interim accounts in late September, where net debt near zero would confirm that the working capital came back. A re-rating from 3.96x to the peer median of 6.7x is worth roughly 74% before any change in the gold price. The other half of that gap has already closed: at 1,043p the shares have reached their own historical median multiple of 3.94x, so what is left is the distance to the sector, not to their own past.